Geopolitics · Issue 02
China builds 54% of the world’s ships. America builds none.
UN via Stimson: China delivered 53.8% of global commercial gross tonnage in 2025. South Korea 27.3%, Japan 13.1%. CSIS: the United States was 0.11% in 2024 and effectively none in 2025. East Asia built 94% of the hulls.
- 01ChinaUN GT, 202553.8
- 02South KoreaUN GT, 202527.3
- 03JapanUN GT, 202513.1
- 04Rest of worldex-US residual, 20255.70
- 05United States (2024)CSIS; 2025 effectively none0.11
- China’s share of commercial GT, 2025
- 53.8%
- South Korea, 2025
- 27.3%
- Japan, 2025
- 13.1%
- United States, 2024 — 2025 effectively none
- 0.11%
The industrial base is a river delta, not a shipyard
CSIS, 22 July 2026: from 2000 to 2025 China’s share of global commercial shipbuilding output went from less than 5% to more than 53%. Stimson, wrapping the UN gross-tonnage table for 2025: China 53.8%, South Korea 27.3%, Japan 13.1%. Ninety-four percent of merchant GT came out of East Asia. The United States was 0.11% in 2024 and, in CSIS’s words, ‘effectively none’ in 2025. A single state firm, CSSC, delivered about 14 million GT in 2024; all US yards together delivered 76,000 GT. CSIS’s sentence is the one that should sit on the wall: CSSC builds more commercial tonnage in a year than the entire US industry has built since the end of the Second World War.
Korea and Japan did not disappear. They lost the easy ships, then the hard ones.
A decade ago South Korea and Japan together held about 58% of world output. CSIS now has them at 38%. The first losses were containers. The later losses are LNG carriers, which is the sophisticated end of the book. Europe still has cruise ships, for now. US policy in 2025 pulled some orders forward into Chinese yards, then briefly cratered China’s order share below 50% in January, then watched it recover to 65% in June and 84% in August 2025. An orderbook is not a navy. It is the factory a navy would need. Pair with The rearmament decade: $2.89 trillion of military spending does not launch a hull that the yard cannot weld.
The long view is dual-use, and it is already built
Own Korean and Japanese yards that still hold LNG and naval work, and the engine, steel and combat-system suppliers around them. Do not own a US ‘shipbuilding renaissance’ equity story as if 0.11% were a rounding error on the way back to 1944. What would change this page: a UN year-table with the United States above 1% of GT, or China below 40%. Neither is 2025.
Investing lens
Horizon 8–20 years · Educational, not advice
Commercial shipbuilding is a three-country industry, and one of them is not a US ally. The investable hull is the Korean or Japanese book that still has a customer; the strategic hull is a policy, not a 2026 earning.
Where the map points
- Korean and Japanese yards with LNG, naval or ice-class backlog
- Marine engines, steel plate, combat systems, and dual-use components
- A measured US yard sleeve only where the Navy has actually appropriated
- Avoid a 232× capacity slide as a portfolio
What can break it
- A freight bust that empties even Chinese orderbooks
- USTR/port fees that reroute orders without creating US GT
- Naval demand that Korea and Japan cannot absorb on top of commercial books
CHART does not recommend securities, funds or trades. Figures can be revised by their publishers. Do your own research and consider regulated advice before allocating capital.
Sources
Every headline number traces to a named publisher. Contextual sources inform the essay, not the key stat.
- 01PrimaryCSIS2026-07-22Charting a New Course: Countering China’s Dominance in Global Shipbuilding
China’s share of commercial shipbuilding output from <5% in 2000 to >53% in 2025. US 0.11% in 2024, effectively none in 2025. Korea+Japan from 58% to 38% over a decade. CSSC > US industry since WWII.
- 02CorroboratedStimson Center2026-07-22Charting a New Course: Countering China’s Dominance in Global Shipbuilding
UN gross-tonnage 2025: China 53.8%, South Korea 27.34%, Japan 13.09%. East Asia 94% of merchant GT delivered.
- 03PrimaryCSIS Hidden Reach2025-03-25Murky Waters: Navigating the Risks of China’s Dual-Use Shipyards
2024: CSSC ~14 million GT; all US yards 76,000 GT and five large ocean-going merchant vessels.
Keep reading
The rearmament decade
World military spending hit $2.89 trillion in 2025. America spent less. Europe and Asia spent enough more to keep the global total rising.
$2.89 tn
World military expenditure, 2025
Ships are taking the long way round
Seaborne trade grew 2.2% in 2024 and is set to crawl at 0.5% in 2025. Tonne-miles jumped 6% — three times the cargo — because vessels are avoiding chokepoints. Distribution of goods is now a distance story.
+6%
Seaborne tonne-miles, 2024
Two-thirds of the canal, gone
The Suez Canal moved a record 1.568 billion tonnes in 2023. In 2024, after the Red Sea became a war, net tonnage fell 66.5% to 525 million. 2025 stayed on the floor. Distribution tech, in this case, is a strait.
−66.5%
Suez net tonnage, 2024 vs 2023
More than the rest of the world combined
SpaceX flew 165 Falcon 9 missions in 2025. The rest of Earth flew fewer. Worldwide orbital attempts hit 324 — a new record on top of 259 in 2024. Launch is how distribution tech leaves the planet.
165
Falcon 9 flights, 2025
China still refines the transition
The IEA’s last minerals outlook was unambiguous: concentration at the refinery rose, not fell. China is the dominant processor of 19 of 20 strategic minerals.
70%
China’s average share of refined supply, 20 minerals